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THE COLLISION OF ZONING ORDINANCES AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
PRIVACY AND ASSOCIATION: CRITIQUE
AND PROGNOSIS
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Moore v. City of East Cleveland and Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, have impacted-ostensibly within theframework of zoning
law-upon first amendment rights ofprivacy and association. This Note examines
thefailure ofthose cases tofashion an appropriate standard to relate zoning restric-
tions to the right to choose one's living companions. The author suggests that, by
recognizing a right offamity choice, the Court has implicitly sanctioned a municpoal-
ityr invocation of amily values" in order to exclude unrelated groups ofindividuals
who, for whatever reason, have chosen to share kitchens.
INTRODUCTION
pOPULATION PRESSURES and shifts in socioeconomic patterns
have stimulated changes in traditional living arrangements,
making inevitable the collision of traditional municipal zoning
prerogatives and assertions of fundamental rights of privacy and
association. Two recent Supreme Court cases, Moore v. City of
East Cleveland' and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,2 suggest that
the conflict which has arisen will not easily be resolved This
Note accordingly examines the Court's failure to fashion a consti-
tutional standard for gauging the impact of zoning restrictions
upon the right to choose one's living companions.
Belle Terre and Moore, while ostensibly zoning cases, raise
even broader issues. The challenged ordinances were alleged to
infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights of the parties in-
volved, in particular, their rights of privacy and association.
In Belle Terre, a homeowner and three unrelated student
tenants brought suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,'
seeking an injunction and a judgment declaring unconstitutional a
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
3. Although Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Belle Terre was joined by six other
Justices, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on separate grounds. In Moore, the plu-
rality opinion of Justice Powell was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall.
A concurring opinion was filed by Justices Brennan and Marshall, elaborating on the plu-
rality view. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on quite different grounds. Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Stewart joined by Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White all filed
dissents on varying grounds. See note 11 infra.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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zoning ordinance which restricted land use to single-family dwell-
ings and which defined "family" to exclude more than two unre-
lated persons living together as a single housekeeping unit. The
plaintiffs' claim of violation of their rights of equal protection, pri-
vacy, association, and travel-approved by the court of ap-
peals-was rejected by the Supreme Court.' The Court held that
the ordinance in question was valid because it bore a rational rela-
tionship to a permissible state objective and thus was not arbi-
trary.6
In Moore, a grandmother living with her two grandsons was
convicted for violating a city zoning ordinance which effectively
restricted permissible living patterns to the nuclear family.7 Since
Mrs. Moore's two grandsons were cousins and not brothers, they
were deemed to fall outside the ordinance's definition of "fam-
ily."' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 In
so doing, the Court extended the existing right of privacy to em-
brace the right of a nuclear or extended family to choose to share
one household. Although Mrs. Moore's family could not techni-
cally meet the narrow definition in the ordinance, the Moores
nevertheless fit into previously accepted judicial notions of protec-
5. For an interesting comparison of the court of appeals' approach with that of the
Supreme Court, see Note, No Dogs, Cats, or Voluntary Families 411owed-Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 784 (1975). The author critiques the Supreme Court's
rejection of the new "intermediate" level of scrutiny applied by the lower court.
6. 416 U.S. at 8. This standard was first articulated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Ordinarily a case that appears to involve constitutional
rights, such as privacy and association, would not be treated merely as "economic and
social legislation." Rather, the lesser standard of mere reasonableness or rationality would
apply only where fundamental rights were not at stake. Since the Court refused to find the
students' fundamental rights of privacy, association, and travel implicated, it was an easy
step for the Court to treat the case as one of mere economic and social legislation, meriting
only a standard of reasonableness instead of a strict scrutiny standard.
7. 431 U.S. at 494. Section 1341.08 of the ordinance stated:
Family means. . . individuals related to the nominal head of the household...
living as a single housekeeping unit. . . but limited to the following: (a) Hus-
band or wife of the nominal head. . . (b) Unmarried children of the nominal
head. . . provided, however, that such unmarried children. . . have no children
residing with them. . . (d) notwithstanding. . . (b). . . a family may include
not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head
* . * and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child.
Id. at 495.
8. Throughout this Note, the term "family" will be used as the Moore Court used it,
to connote persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, except in factual situations
where groups of people desire to call themselves "families" for specific purposes (for exam-
ple, in order to receive food stamps or similar welfare benefits).
9. 431 U.S. at 500.
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tion of family sanctity."°
Moore stands for the general proposition that the time-
honored deference to municipal zoning authority must give way if
an ordinance deprives a "family," either nuclear or extended, of
the fundamental right to choose to live together."' The Belle
Terre court, however, declared that a local zoning authority may,
in the name of "family values," prescribe household composition
to exclude certain persons or prevent certain living arrangements
in a community.' u Moore thus created a new right of family
choice under the general rubrics of privacy and associational
rights, while Belle Terre invented a new rationale for the exercise
of state police power to circumscribe those same rights.
10. Justice Powell reasoned that the extended family and its protected status have
been recognized in the "teachings of history" and in the "basic values that underlie our
society." Id. at 503. Thus, it appears that constitutional protections of privacy also extend
to families such as the Moores. It is ironic, however, that the range of family choice was
extended under the privacy umbrella, seemingly creating a new right of privacy, while at
the same time, the Moore Court's privacy discussion has actually narrowed the law of
privacy by ignoring other types of privacy. See text accompanying notes 108-61 infra.
I I. In Moore, the plurality focused on carving out a right of family choice. Justices
Brennan and Marshall elaborated on the plurality opinion, decrying the "cultural myopia"
of zoning ordinances which treat only nuclear families as families per se, 431 U.S. at
507-10 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring), and reaffirming earlier decisions upholding
the sanctity of the family against state intrusion. Id. at 510-1I.
Justice Stevens preferred the principle applied in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928), that, if an ordinance is clearly arbitrary, with no substantial relation to
health, welfare, safety, or morals, the local government is constitutionally prohibited from
interfering with individual property rights. He further preferred to look to the myriad state
decisions which have upheld the right of persons to form a "single housekeeping unit,"
whether such persons are related or not. 431 U.S. at 5 14-20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger's dissent noted that Mrs. Moore had failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies in not seeking a variance and thus had burdened the Court's docket. Id. at
521-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found Belle Terre to be
dispositive and insisted that the "biological fact of common ancestry" should not create a
special constitutional right of association. Id. at 534-35 (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissent-
ing). Justice White challenged the plurality's substantive due process approach, preferring
not to breathe any further life into that mode of due process analysis. 431 U.S. at 544
(White, J., dissenting).
12. 416 U.S. at 9. In Belle Terre, the majority focused on land use legislation, the
deference to be accorded state and local discretion in the area of zoning, and judicial re-
spect for legislative line-drawing for the good of the community. The Court relied heavily
on the leading cases of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), although it did so at some cost to logic, and with a strained
application of the facts of those cases to the facts of Belle Terre. 416 U.S. at 3-6. See text
accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
Justice Brennan insisted there was no case or controversy since the student claimants
whose rights were at issue had moved out. Id. at 10-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall agreed on the broad discretion to be accorded zoning authorities, but he saw the
issue as one of fundamental constitutional rights superseding legislative discretion, thus
requiring strict scrutiny. Id. at 12-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In order to examine the inconsistencies raised by the Moore
and Belle Terre opinions, this Note adopts a threefold approach.
First, it sketches the history of adjudication in the area of zoning
law, noting that judicial development has been left largely to the
state courts. 13 Moore and Belle Terre are contrasted with key
state decisions on the power of zoning authorities to prescribe
household composition. 14
Second, the Note discusses the apparent narrowing of the de-
veloping right of privacy. 5 This right has emerged from shadowy
areas of the Constitution over the last thirty years,16 provoking the
Court's strict scrutiny and invalidation of intrusive legislative and
executive acts in a broad variety of contexts. 7 This examination
leads to the suggestion that the Court was unnecessarily con-
strained in its treatment of the privacy assertions in both Moore
and Belle Terre.'8
Third, the Note explores the nascent right of association in its
socioeconomic dimension, as developed in United States Depart-
ment ofAgriculture v. Moreno.1' In Moreno, the right of persons
to invite others-whether related or not-to live with them was
classed as fundamental by Justice Douglas, and not to be inter-
fered with by the government.2 ° Yet the same right, and Moreno,
were dismissed by him as "inapt" in Belle Terre, one year later.2'
13. See text accompanying notes 24-58 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 59-95 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 96-124 infra.
16. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In this leading case, the Court
invalidated a state ban on contraceptive use as an infringement on the constitutional right
of privacy. Justice Douglas based his opinion on the theory that although the right of
privacy is not explicitly found in the language of the Constitution, specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights are surrounded by penumbral zones of privacy, without which the literal
language of the amendments would leave only a few rights truly protected. Id. at 481-86.
17. If the Court perceives a fundamental interest at stake, strict scrutiny of the state or
federal law is the appropriate analytical standard. Privacy is, at least since Griswold, such a
fundamental interest. See note 16 supra. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 616-56, 788-838 (9th ed. 1975). The broad concept of "privacy" has been
held to embrace such matters as not having one's stomach pumped by police in search of
criminal evidence, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); procreative freedom, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the purchase of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 301
U.S. 479 (1965); not being sterilized against one's will, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); freedom from police seizure of obscene literature from one's home, Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and receiving political literature without special Post Office inter-
vention, Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
18. See text accompanying notes 125-59 infra.
19. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See text accompanying notes 161-80 infra.
20. 413 U.S. at 543.
21. 416 U.S. at 8 n.6.
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The plurality in Moore, however, appears to cite Moreno with ap-
proval.22 The Note traces the implications of these judicial incon-
sistencies within the framework of the right of association.
The Note concludes by proposing that in analyzing Belle Terre
and Moore, the Court should have adopted the approach devel-
oped by state courts in fifty years of adjudication. Within this
model, the Court would have applied a combination of strict scru-
tiny and rational relation standards to each zoning provision to
determine whether it was reasonable or arbitrary. Thus, an arbi-
trary provision would be one that distinguished between related
and unrelated classes of people. As Justice Powell said in Moore:
[The Court has a] continuing obligation to test the justifications
offered by the state for state-imposed constraints which signifi-
cantly hamper those modes of individualfu#illment which are at
the heart of a free society .... [Tlhe Constitution prevents
[the municipality] from standardizing its children-and its
adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family
patterns.2y
The Court in both Belle Terre and Moore appears to have for-
gotten this obligation. By being preoccupied with "family" values
and rights, the two decisions unnecessarily complicated zoning
law by inventing a new police power for zoning authorities to ex-
ercise in Belle Terre, and by inventing, in Moore, a new right
which only traditional families may exercise in the face of restric-
tive zoning provisions. Neither invention was necessary. Given
the confusion engendered by superimposing privacy jurisprudence
over zoning law, neither decision was particularly wise.
I. WHY Do SIx PRIESTS CONSTITUTE A VALID,
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED "FAMILY UNIT,"
WHILE SIX STUDENTS Do NOT?
A. Background and State Cases
Zoning ordinances originally developed as a means of control-
ling land use in urban areas. The early twentieth century popula-
tion exodus from the countryside to cities and increasing
industrialization spawned the creation of planning boards in an
effort to order the chaos.24 The power of the planning boards to
22. 431 U.S. at 500 n.7.
23. Id. at 503 n.l 1, 506 (emphasis added).
24. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 371-76, 386-87 (1926). For
an illuminating discussion of zoning law development, see Case Note, Constitutional
Lan-Municipal Ordinance Limiting Occupancy ofHomeowner's Dwelling to Certain Family
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design the urban environment was attacked by developers as an
unconstitutional taking of property without due process or com-
pensation
The Supreme Court's principal foray into this area was in de-
ciding a land use question in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. ,26 in 1926. In Euclid, the village attempted to preserve its ru-
ral character from industrial encroachment by the adjacent city of
Cleveland. The developer wanted to expand its commercial prop-
erty into Euclid, claiming that to deny it this right would greatly
diminish the value of the property and constitute a taking without
due process.2 The Supreme Court held Euclid's ordinance to be
a valid exercise of the village's authority, establishing the constitu-
tional standard of validity for zoning ordinances, and granting
broad latitude and extreme deference to local zoning authorities.28
During the subsequent half century, the Supreme Court deftly
avoided rendering any further opinions19 in this delicate area of
local autonomy, except where racially restrictive covenants raised
constitutional questions under the fourteenth amendment." Thus
development of zoning case law remained primarily, until Belle
Terre and Moore, at the state judicial level.
Consistent with the historic origins of zoning power, litigation
in state courts has primarily involved land use controversies.31
Members Violative of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause- Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 21 How. LJ. 645, 645-48 (1978). Seegenerall, 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed.) §§ 1-3 (1976); Annot., 52 L. Ed. 2d 863, 865-67 (1978).
25. 272 U.S. at 368-70.
26. Id. at 365 (1926). A few other zoning cases have reached the Supreme Court, but
Euclid remains the standard. See note 29 infra.
27. 272 U.S. at 395.
28. Id.
29. There are three exceptions to this statement. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962), the Court held that an amendment to an excavation ordinance which
effectively stopped a beneficial mining business did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court refused to find that the use of eminent
domain to rezone private property for residential use in a slum redevelopment project vio-
lated plaintiff's due process. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the
Court found that the failure to grant a variance from a residential zoning ordinance vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment.
30. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in which a discriminatory restrictive
covenant was held unconstitutional.
31. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 24, §§ 3.08, 3.10. Customarily, zoning ordinances
are within the police power of a community if they relate to the physical division of that
community into districts for residential, industrial, commercial, or mixed uses. Euclid es-
tablished the general constitutionality of zoning power against private property owners. As
long as the mandated use of the land is not arbitrary, Euclid assures that general zoning
ordinances will stand. Litigation since Euclid has thus related to the application of zoning
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Property owners or real estate developers oriented to investment
potential and a maximum rate of return generally square off
against municipalities intent on optimal housing density, provi-
sion of open space, reasonable distribution of water, sewer, and
utility services, and minimization of traffic congestion.32 Code
provisions manifesting these traditional zoning objec-
tives-minimum lot size, building height limits, floor space re-
quired per occupant, number of buildings per acre and numerous
other physical specifications33 -have seldom suffered invalidation.
Local laws enacted to achieve these goals have continued to be
measured by the Euclid standard: as long as the ordinance is
neither unreasonable nor clearly arbitrary, it will be sustained.34
If a zoning authority prefers a purely residential pattern with
no commercial or mixed uses, ordinances typically limit single
dwellings to a "single housekeeping unit '35 or "single economic
unit" with shared sleeping, eating, and cooking facilities. As Jus-
tice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion in Moore, the
legitimacy of these restrictions is well-settled. 6
A more difficult issue, however, is the right of zoning authori-
ties to reach inside residential dwellings and specify the preferred
composition of a household. In the past fifteen years this issue has
arisen with increasing frequency in the state courts.37 Although
the factual settings vary widely in these cases, it is generally held
sufficient that the parties who have ostensibly violated a house-
hold composition provision have "economic or other personal rea-
sons for living together as a bona fide single housekeeping unit."
38
Thus nearly all state court decisions in which household composi-
tion is at issue indicate that any attempt by local government to
define who may occupy a dwelling must fail.3
9
Zoning ordinances containing references to or explicit defini-
tions of "family" have been invalidated in various ways in state
provisions to particular parcels of land. See also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. E.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925).
33. 272 U.S. at 388, 391-95.
34. 431 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. E.g., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 80-81 n.3, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242,
249 n.3 (1962); Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 359, 84 A.2d 687, 689
(1951).
36. 431 U.S. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 24, at §§ 9.29-.33.
38. Marino v. Mayor of Norwood, 77 NJ. Super. 587, 594, 187 A.2d 217, 221 (1963).
39. E.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 IlL. 2d 432, 436-37, 216 N.E.2d 116,
118-19 (1966).
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courts. The court may rule that the group before it-whether it is
a group of six priests,4" ten foster children,4 or four unrelated
young men 42-is a "family" for purposes of the ordinance,4 3 or it
may reject the "family" provision outright as unconstitutional.'
The former, less drastic, as-applied approach to statutory con-
struction is by far preferable to wholesale invalidation. Zoning is
still, under the Euclid standard, an area of presumed legislative
sensitivity and competence. Nonetheless, it is evident from the
nearly universal condemnation of narrowly defined "family" re-
quirements that they are not regarded as legitimate zoning objec-
tives or as rational means to achieve traditional land use
controls.45
Closer examination of three representative state cases reveals
similar reasons for the states' aversion to narrow household com-
position requirements. The highest courts in New York,4 6 New
Jersey,47 and Illinois,48 for example, have proceeded from the
40. Eg., Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis.
609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954) (holding that a group of priests and lay brothers living together
in a single housekeeping unit constituted a family within the zoning ordinance and did not
constitute a prohibited convent); Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc.,
306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943) (holding that five priests and two servants constituted
a "family" and that their use of a single-family dwelling for residential purposes did not
violate a "family" ordinance).
41. E.g., City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (holding that a couple living with their two natural children and ten
foster children qualified as a single "family" unit).
42. E.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I11. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (holding
that four tenants who were unrelated young men were not restricted by a "family" ordi-
nance).
43. Eg., City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). See note 41 supra.
44. Eg., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241,251-52, 281 A.2d
513, 518 (1971).
45. Id. at 248-52, 281 A.2d at 517-19. The Court in Kirsch said: "The practical diffi-
culty of applying land use regulation to prevent the evil [unruly and immoral conduct by
young summer renters] is found in the seeming inability to define the offending groups
precisely enough so as not to include innocuous groups within the prohibition." Id. at 253,
281 A.2d at 519.
The court in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966),
noted only one case which sustained a conviction for violation of a "family" ordinance.
That was City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961). Both
Kirsch, 59 N.J. at 250, 281 A.2d at 518, and Trotuner, 34 Ill. 2d at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119,
disavowed the reasoning in Johnson. The Johnson court had regarded the restrictive zon-
ing ordinance as an anti-overcrowding regulation, which legitimately outlawed too many
foster children in one home. Since Belle Terre and Moore, however, the Johnson result
may not be quite so aberrant. See notes 59-95 infra and accompanying text.
46. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974).
47. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
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premise that zoning power may not extend beyond land use con-
trols. As the Court of Appeals of New York stated in City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli,49 "zoning is intended to control types of
housing and living conditions and not the genetic or intimate fam-
ily relations of human beings."5 Defendants in this case were a
homeowner, a tenant couple, their two biological children, and ten
foster children, seven of whom were related to each other. The
court decided that insofar as the licensed group home was struc-
tured as a "single housekeeping unit" and bore the "generic char-
acter of a family unit," the group qualified as a "family" under the
ordinance. t
In Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,52 the New
Jersey Supreme Court went further. In this case, zoning authori-
ties sought to exclude rowdy groups from summer resort commu-
nities by allowing only conventional "families" to rent summer
homes. The court held that the municipality's efforts to ban cer-
tain "obnoxious" groups from summer resort areas by defining
permissible "family" renters as those related by blood or mar-
riage, and by requiring collective groups to be "of a permanent
and distinct domestic character" and married to each other, swept
too broadly. It affected "innocuous" groups as well, and violated
the due process rights of prospective tenants. 3 "Family" prescrip-
tions had no real and substantial relation to the express objective
of preventing drunken and immoral behavior of summer rent-
ers:
54
[A] general municipal restriction of occupancy of dwelling
units to groups of persons all of whom are related to each other
by blood, marriage or adoption is unreasonably restrictive of
the ordinary and natural utility of such property as dwellings
for people, and of the right of unrelated people in reasonable
number to have recourse to common housekeeping facilities in
circumstances free of detriment to the general health, safety
and welfare ....
Thus, the ordinance as a whole fell as an unconstitutional in-
48. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
49. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
50. Id. at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
51. Id. at 304-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758-59, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
52. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
53. Id. at 248-52, 281 A.2d at 516-18.
54. Id. at 251, 281 A.2d at 518. "It is elementary that substantive due process de-
mands that zoning regulations. . . be reasonably exercised. . .[and] the means selected
must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought .. " Id.
55. Id. at 252, 281 A.2d at 519 (emphasis added) (quoting Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v.
City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970)).
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fringement on any person's rights to choose to live in one house-
hold.
Without deciding the constitutional due process and equal
protection questions raised by the defendants in City of Des
Plaines v. Troutner56 and without quite deciding that four unre-
lated male defendants were a "family," the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois found a "family" requirement to be an invalid classification.
The court observed that other decisions emphasized the "single
housekeeping unit" aspect of the definition of family,57 disapprov-
ing intrusive legislative inquiries concerning consanguinity or af-
finity. The court further observed that blood or marital ties are
neither guarantees of stability, morality, and discipline, nor sure
prevention of transiency, noise, traffic congestion, and other urban
evils. 8
A biological family with eight children, a history of unemploy-
ment, and an impending divorce may stimulate any of the evils
which such "family" zoning limits are designed to avoid. Thus,
these state cases stand for the proposition that relatedness or lack
of it do not answer a community's need for peace, quiet, and ra-
tional development.
B. Belle Terre and Moore
In light of the Supreme Court's half-century of virtual abdica-
tion of authority in the area of zoning law, it is startling to find
only one Justice citing these state decisions as a guide in either of
the two principal cases. 9
Euclid, relied on extensively in Belle Terre, is, of course, an
unassailable starting point in any zoning controversy. 60 The Belle
Terre court, however, noted rather cryptically that the instant case
56. 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
57. Id. at 436-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119-20.
58. Id. at 436-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
59. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concurring). If
the Court deliberately left development of zoning law to state courts, and those courts had
ample opportunity to confront the very issue of interference with individual choice of
household companions by zoning boards, it seems odd for the Supreme Court to ignore the
states' collective wisdom on the subject entirely.
60. Euclid is so firmly established that the term "Euclidean zoning" has been coined
to represent division of an area into various land uses. See I R. ANDERSON, supra note 24,
§ 3.01. Both Belle Terre and Moore acknowledged Euclid as a starting point for analysis.
431 U.S. at 498; 416 U.S. at 3. That each state court began with Euclids guidance is no
excuse to forget that Euclid's general land use context-and its validation of zoning author-
ity--is superseded when zoning boards go beyond land use controls.
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was a "different phase" from Euclid.6 Euclid in particular and
zoning power in general were several times characterized as in-
volving land use control-the "usual" phase-and urban planning
controversies. 62 Therefore, it must be assumed that the Court did
not regard the challenged village ordinance as being the common
land use variety validated in Euclid.
Wherever state courts have confronted zoning ordinances
which attempt to limit internal household composition, they have
recognized that such regulation does not satisfy land use goals and
exceeds legitimate zoning.63  These courts' mode of analysis
shifted from near-total deference to legislative prerogatives to a
more critical stance. Remaining within the Euclid guidelines,
state courts tested the rationality of the means for achieving speci-
fied zoning objectives. When the latter were the usual ones of
noise and traffic reduction, or optimum housing density, the courts
found the means used-requirements that permissible occupants
be related by blood, marriage, or adoption-not to be rationally
related to the locality's objectives.' This suggests that the Belle
Terre Court need not have strayed from Euclid. The Court could
have remained deferential, using minimal or perhaps intermediate
scrutiny, and found the "family" requirement clearly arbitrary, as
urged by the court of appeals.65
Although the Court in Belle Terre ignored Euclid's admoni-
tion that zoning laws not be arbitrary, it did, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, adopt the fear of industrial conversion and urban blight first
articulated in Euclid66 and reaffirmed in Berman v. Parker.67
61. 416 U.S. at 3.
62. Id. at 3, 5, 9. Justice Marshall saw a constitutional infirmity in Belle Terre's ordi-
nance reaching "beyond control of the use of the land." Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. See text accompanying notes 24-58 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
65. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1
(1974). The court of appeals used an intermediate, more flexible standard of compliance
with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment: "whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute." Id. at 814. The
Second Circuit found Belle Terre's ordinance to be discriminatory and unsupported by any
rational basis. Id. at 808. For useful commentaries on the Second Circuit's approach in
the Belle Terre case, see Note, supra note 5; Note, ip the Down-Sliding Scale: Boraas v.
Village of Belle Terre andthe Equal Protection Assault on Restrictive Defnitions of "Family"
in Zoning Ordinances, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 428 (1973). See generally Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward" In Search of EvolvingDoctrine on a Changing Court:
A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Finally, it should be
noted that Justice Marshall, dissenting, would have preferred strict equal protection scru-
tiny where fundamental rights are at stake. 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 416 U.S. at 3-5.
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That is, the Belle Terre Court brought the following considera-
tions to bear upon the constitutionality of the ordinance in ques-
tion: danger of fire or collapse of buildings, offensive industries,
the ugly sores and misery of blighted urban housing, and suffoca-
tion of the human spirit.68 It strains the imagination to utilize the
stark language of Euclid and Berman to support the efforts of a
remote, bucolic village of 700 people on the north shore of Long
Island to exclude six students from their community. The Court,
however, did exactly that, declaring that in order for a zoning
board to justify the exercise of its powers, "even those historic po-
lice power problems need not loom large or actually be existent in
a given case." 69
More significantly, the Court invented new zoning objec-
tives-wide yards, "youth and family values," clean air-and
linked them explicitly to "family needs."7 The phrase "family
needs" marks a bold departure from the firmly held view of state
courts that zoning authorities may not dictate the character of a
residential community by deciding who may live with whom.7'
Zoning authorities could traditionally specify density limits; Belle
Terre indicates that they may now also look inside homes to see if
the "correct" people are living there.
Belle Terre further implies, without elaboration by the Court,
that "family" necessarily connotes the white-picket-fence, subur-
ban, nuclear variety, with no more than two unrelated persons per
household.72 Giving zoning boards the authority to set such limits
on household composition is a far cry from Euclid's exercise of
67. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Berman represents a rare example of a Supreme Court zoning
decision. As earlier noted, the Court preferred to leave zoning law development to state
courts from Euclid until Belle Terre, a span of nearly 50 years. See notes 29-30 supra and
accompanying text. Since Berman, however, involved the District of Columbia and a fed-
eral law, there was no state court in which to litigate.
Justice Douglas cited his Berman opinion in Belle Terre to demonstrate that public
welfare is not to be construed only in the narrowest sense of health and cleanliness. He had
found in Berman that the legislature was entitled to make Washington "beautiful" as well.
348 U.S. at 33. Extending that idea to embrace "wide yards and open spaces" in Belle
Terre is not an untoward judicial prerogative. It is difficult to compare, however, the effect
of six student renters on a small community, and the cancerous blight of a Washington,
D.C. ghetto. With no evidence on the record to suggest the students were a nuisance, see
416 U.S. at 20, it seems that the Court merely derived presumptions from factually inappo-
site urban renewal cases.
68. 416 U.S. at 3-5.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 9.
71. See text accompanying notes 35-59 supra.
72. 416 U.S. at 9.
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police power. Given Belle Terre's preoccupation with "wide
yards," "few people," and the "blessings of quiet seclusion, '73 a
zoning board could decide that foster homes, group homes for the
mentally handicapped, or other similar voluntary associations
with a legitimate need to form a single household were inconsis-
tent with "family and youth values" and therefore excludable. It
appears that zoning boards will no longer have to try to justify
regulation of household composition on the tenuous grounds of
health, safety, welfare, or morals-justifications which consis-
tently failed before state courts.74 With "family needs" as a new
and convenient hook upon which zoning boards may now hang
their decisionmaking, potential plaintiffs will find it difficult to
demonstrate the irrationality of restrictive provisions such as those
in Belle Terre. Zoning boards may now indulge in social control
as well as land use planning. Boards will not have to explain why
unrelated homeowners or tenants might adversely affect a residen-
tial community if the status of being unrelated is ipso facto
enough to justify exclusion.
Needless to say, such a weapon in the arsenal of already pow-
erful zoning.boards is a great boon to exclusionary zoning.75 Zon-
ing laws are ostensibly subject to constitutional restraint through
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.76 Nonetheless, Belle Terre's express judicial sanction
of zoning authorities' use of a classification to exclude persons
from a community would seem to deprive any fourteenth amend-
ment challenge of much of its force, absent a religious, political, or
73. Id.
74. See text accompanying notes 37-59 supra.
75. "Exclusionary" zoning is not to be confused with the more general term "restric-
tive zoning ordinance". This latter term as used herein simply recognizes that there are
limitations of all varieties in an ordinance. "Exclusionary" has been defined as "zoning
that raises the price of residential access to a particular area, and thereby denies that access
to members of low-income groups." Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STANFORD L. REV. 767 (1969). Requirements for
substantial minimum floor space, or several-acre lot sizes have been the usual barriers to
those persons with lesser financial resources. Nonetheless, until Belle Terre, poorer persons
could band together to pool resources. Now municipalities may constitutionally demand
that those wh6 pool their resources be related by blood, marriage, or adoption as well.
Belle Terre in this sense is of a piece with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and City of Eastlake v. Forest City En-
terprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) where the Court upheld exclusionary zoning ordinances.
76. The Court in Belle Terre noted specifically that if Belle Terre's ordinance had set
aside an area for only one race, it would have violated the fourteenth amendment. 416
U.S. at 6. It rejected as inapposite, however, arguments based on procedural disparities or
deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. at 7. Had the facts been such that the
plaintiffs could have made such an argument, the ordinance might have fallen.
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free speech dimension.77
The effect of Belle Terre on state courts is not yet clear. It is
interesting that the New York court in Ferraioli reached the same
result as had other state courts in spite of the fact that it followed
Belle Terre by several months. Ferraioli does, however, appear to
be phrased in more cautious language than the pre-Belle Terre
state cases. As noted earlier, Ferraloli described the group home
as having the "generic character of a family unit,"78 phraseology
meant to distinguish Belle Terre as a case expressly concerning
"transiency." 79 The court appeared constrained by Belle Terre to
import an element of relative permanency into the context of a
foster home as opposed to the presumably peripatetic existence of
the college students who wanted to live in Belle Terre. Justice
Douglas, however, had expressly denied that Belle Terre's ordi-
nance was aimed at transients,"0 implying that had it been so
aimed, a fundamental rights issue may have been successfully
raised by the students. The only problem with the students was
that they did not share the biological or marital ties consistently
found to be unnecessary in state decisions. "Family values" may
thus apparently defeat the "right of unrelated persons to. . .have
recourse to common housekeeping facilities,""' no matter what
their reasons for choosing to share kitchens.
It is not at all surprising to find the Court in Moore character-
izing Belle Terre as supporting its decision to invalidate East
Cleveland's ordinance.8 2 Promotion of "family needs" and "fam-
ily values" having become a new sine qua non for the constitution-
77. Since these rights are explicitly protected by the first amendment, it would pre-
sumably be more difficult for zoning power to interfere with their exercise. 416 U.S. at 14
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. 34 N.Y.2d at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453. See notes 50-51 supra
and accompanying text.
79. 34 N.Y.2d at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
80. 416 U.S. at 7. The Court said "[The zoning ordinance] is not aimed at transients."
If it had been so aimed, Belle Terre would have been decided on the strict equal protection
grounds of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Id. at 7. That leading case declared
unconstitutional certain welfare laws which contained minimum residency requirements of
a year. The decision established a constitutional right to travel and settle in a community
without losing the right to welfare aid. Justice Marshall in his dissent urged Shapiro as one
of a number of suitable precedents for the instant case. Id. at 18.
In spite of Belle Terre's denial of the transiency issue, Justice Stevens, in Moore, quoted
Ferraloli's view of Belle Terre on transiency with approval. 431 U.S. at 416 n.9.
81. Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 349, 271
A.2d 430, 434 (1970), cited with approval in Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,
59 N.J. 241, 246, 281 A.2d 513, 519 (1971).
82. 431 U.S. at 511.
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ality of zoning ordinances, the Moore Court could not tolerate
East Cleveland's "slicing deeply into the family itself. 8 3
To invalidate East Cleveland's zoning ordinance, the Court
had to depart from the minimal scrutiny applied in Belle Terre
and Euclid. Thus, after passing reference to zoning matters, the
Court turned to considerations of substantive due process and pri-
vacy jurisprudence, thus triggering a strict scrutiny analysis and its
almost inevitable concomitant, invalidation.8 4  The Court ex-
tracted a substantive "right of family choice" from prior privacy
cases-85 -effectively forbidding zoning boards from regulating nu-
clear or extended families.
It is a discretionary custom of the Supreme Court to avoid de-
ciding broad constitutional issues wherever narrower, alternative
grounds will suffice. The Euclid Court itself admonished:
In the realm of constitutional law, especially, this Court has
perceived the embarrassment which is likely to result from an
attempt to formulate rules or decide questions beyond the ne-
cessities of the immediate issue. It has preferred ... a gradual
approach ... by a systematically guarded application and ex-
tension of constitutional principles to particular cases as they
arise. . . .This process applies with peculiar force to the solu-
tion of questions arising under the due process clause of the
Constitution as applied to the exercise of the flexible powers of
police . . 6
This warning was given within the context of Ambler Realty's
challenge to the very existence of an anti-industrial zoning law. 7
In the absence of a challenge to a specific provision of that law,
the Court sustained it in toto. The Court indicated, however, that
if a specific provision of that law were ever challenged, it could be
found arbitrary and struck down as unconstitutional.88
Just such a challenge was raised two years later in Nec/ow v.
City of Cambridge.8 9 In that case, a zoning ordinance not unlike
83. Id. at 498.
84. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 616-56.
For an analysis of the Moore Court's use of precedent in privacy and substantive due
process areas, see Note, Constitutionally Protected Notions ofFamily: Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 19 B. C. L. REv. 959 (1978). The Note suggests that Justice Powell's plurality
opinion ignored the presence in prior cases of additional facts, such as the existence of a
contractual right, which allowed those decisions to affirm a right of privacy. The Note
concludes that a "right of family choice" should not have been drawn out of these cases.
85. 431 U.S. at 501.
86. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
87. Id. at 370.
88. Id. at 395.
89. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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that in Euclid was challenged on grounds that a specific provision,
as applied to Mr. Nectow's property, resulted in an unconstitu-
tional taking of that property. The ordinance as a whole was sus-
tained under Euclid's guidance, but the specific zoning restriction
placed on Nectow's property was held to be arbitrary. It bore no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare and was, therefore, unconstitutional.9"
Likewise, in Moore, the issue was focused not on an entire or-
dinance, biat on a peculiarly narrow version of the common inter-
nal composition regulations dealt with by state courts.9' It seems
that under Euclid and Nectow, as well as the state decisions noted
earlier, the Moore Court could simply have found the specific
"family" restriction to be arbitrary. The Court need not have re-
sorted to the extreme measure of extracting a new right from the
area of privacy and substantive due process in order to protect
"family values." A serviceable "as-applied" approach could have
been used to invalidate the challenged provision, thus eliminating
the need to create a new constitutional right. As the plurality in
Moore itself acknowledged, fashioning a new substantive due
process right is a risky business.92 Justice Powell referred to sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence as occasionally "treacherous
.. .for this Court. . . . [T]he history of the Lochner era ...
counsels caution and restraint."93 Indeed, caution may wel help
to explain why Justice Powell could only garner three other votes
for his opinion.94
90. Id. at 188-89.
91. 431 U.S. at 496.
92. Id. at 502-03.
93. Id. at 502.
94. Such meager support does not create the kind of precedential value on which fu-
ture litigants may wish to rely in asserting the "right to family choice" of living compan-
ions. It is not difficult to imagine future courts reasoning that Moore should be restricted to
its uniquely poignant facts: a grandmother can not be torn from her motherless grandsons
by a capriciously narrow zoning provision.
American society is in the throes of change. Conventional notions of family no longer
adequately describe social and cultural reality. All manner of groups without blood or
kinship ties claim "family" status: lesbians with children, two or more couples and chil-
dren sharing one home for economic or other reasons, widows and widowers setting up
housekeeping together without matrimonial ties to avoid loss of the woman's Social Secur-
ity benefits. Only the latter "family" would find constitutional support for the arrange-
ment, since Moore cum Belle Terre permit a maximum of two unrelated individuals to
comprise a family for purposes of a restrictive zoning ordinance.
By limiting the invocation of this new right of family choice to traditional family group-
ings, Moore further narrowed the utility of its decision. Arguably, the Court was moved by
the pathos of Mrs. Moore being branded a criminal for wanting her extended family to live
with her. Pathos, however, is not restricted to situations involving blood relations. It is not
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Arguably Belle Terre's strengthening of traditional zoning
power stands as a symbol of local autonomy in an era of broad
invasions of local prerogative by the federal government. Such a
bias toward local autonomy and community self-definition merges
with Moore's warning against local legislative tampering with di-
verse family groupings. But this otherwise commendable blend of
local power with cultural tradition produces a curious result. On
one hand, the biological family may have to struggle to assert its
sanctity before zoning boards, given the split in the Moore
Court.95 On the other hand, after Belle Terre, zoning boards will
have virtually a carte blanche to exclude from a given neighbor-
hood anyone whom they define as nonfamily. Resolution of this
tension will determine the extent to which "residential" zoning be-
comes "biological family" zoning.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY AFTER BELLE
TERRE AND MOORE
The ramifications of Belle Terre and Moore for the constitu-
tional rights of privacy and association are unclear. It may well be
that these two cases are part of the general tendency of the Court
to resist further expansion of these rights.
Moore created a supposedly new right of family choice. The
decision has thus been criticized as an unwarranted extension of
the privacy rights already existing in the areas of child rearing,
procreation, and marital relations.96 It is well-settled, however,
that the right of privacy extends beyond the literal confines of
these three contexts. Rather, the liberty of choosing to live with
one's kin, affirmed in Moore, may be regarded as fitting comforta-
bly into a broader context in which privacy protection extends to
such rights as distributing contraceptives, 97 receiving political mail
without government interference,9" and not having one's stomach
at all difficult to conjure up stories of retired school teachers, welfare mothers, young,
poorly paid workers, and others unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption, sharing a com-
mon household purely out of need. The Moore decision's preoccupation with nuclear and
extended families suggests that these less conventional, unconsanguinous groups, ever
more common in American society, will not be able to claim a constitutional right to live
together if confronted with a "family" limitation in a residential zoning ordinance.
95. See note II supra.
96. See Note, supra note 84.
97. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning a state ban on the sale of
contraceptives).
98. Lamont v. United States Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (finding that a
federal law allowing the Post Office to destroy "communist propaganda" violated the first
amendment).
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forcibly pumped by police.9 9 In fact, given the variety of free-
doms which have come under the protective umbrella of the con-
stitutional right to privacy, it is surprising that Moore was a mere
plurality and that Belle Terre so resoundingly defeated the privacy
claim at issue in that case.
A. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
In Griswold v. Connecticut, °0  Justice Douglas stated that the
right of privacy emanated from penumbral zones which surround
several constitutional amendments. In Griswold, a state ban on
the use of contraceptives was challenged as an invalid intrusion
into the privacy of married couples. The Court found that en-
forcement of the ban could encourage police prying to find the
"telltale signs" of contraceptives. This prying into the innermost
sanctum of the home was held to be an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy.' 10  That was in 1965. Quite recently, Justice Rehnquist
conceded the existence of such a constitutional right, but only in
the context of the fourth amendment's direct proscription against
illegal searches and seizures.'0 2  Supreme Court opinions vary
widely when addressing the true source of a constitutional privacy
guarantee; 0 3 likewise, the form of the right ranges from freedom
to receive political propaganda through the mail without having
to register with the Post Office, to freedom to use or distribute
contraceptives. Privacy law has been called an "unrelated bag of
goodies"'" and a "haystack in a hurricane."'0 5 It has stimulated
broad and heated commentary and has been divided into so many
generic categories 0 6 that a recent article on economic dimensions
99. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that forced stomach-pumping
by police violated due process).
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Id. at 485.
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), Justice Rehnquist reiterated this narrow view. A man's name and
photograph were circulated to shopkeepers on an "active shoplifters" bulletin. Although
distribution occurred after the charges had been dropped, the Court found no unconstitu-
tional invasion of his privacy. Id. at 713.
103. Eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for the majority, found a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees." Id. at 485. He included the first, third, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments as sources of this right to privacy. Justice Goldberg singled out the ninth
amendment as well. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
104. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
105. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
106. E.g., Gerety, Redfining Privacy, 12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS Civ. LIB. L. REV. 233
[Vol. 30:155
PRIVACYAND ZONING
of the right of privacy refused to "spill any more ink" on that
intellectual conundrum.10 7
But to chart the fate of the right of privacy after Belle Terre
and Moore, it is necessary to spill a little ink to delineate the spec-
trum of privacy law into which the two cases fit. The right of pri-
vacy was first conceptualized in the legendary 1890 article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 0 8 They proposed that every
person had a "right to be let alone" or a right to keep one's iden-
tity intact, analogous to private property rights and the law of def-
amation.10 9 After a New York court rejected the idea in 1902 as a
judicial interference in legislative business,"' public outrage pro-
voked the state legislature to promulgate the first state privacy
law, which forbade the unauthorized use of a person's name or
image for commercial purposes."' What followed was the spo-
radic acceptance of such a right by state courts and state legisla-
tures over the next half century."
2
(1977). In this article the terms "autonomy," "identity," and "intimacy" are used to cap-
sulize privacy law. See also Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHILOSOPHY &
PUB. AFF. 26 (1976); Comment, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate
Decision, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1447 (1976).
107. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978). In his introduction,
Professor Posner states: "The concept of'privacy' is elusive and ill-defined. Much ink has
been spilled in trying to clarify its meaning. I will avoid the definitional problem by simply
noting that one aspect of privacy ... is the withholding or concealment of information."
Id. at 393.
108. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
109. Id. at 193.
110. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Mrs.
Roberson's picture had been used to advertise flour without her consent. She sued for
invasion of her privacy. The court of appeals denied her relief, saying that "the so-called
'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence and ... the
doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law
. .Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
111. 132 N.Y. Laws §§ 1-2 (1903), as amended, N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (Mc-
Kinney 1921).
112. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904) is the semi-
nal state privacy decision. In Pavesich, the Supreme Court of Georgia expressly rejected
New York's view. The plaintiffs name and picture in this case had been used to advertise
insurance. Like Warren and Brandeis, the court implicitly recognized a right of privacy in
the law of nuisance. In dicta, the court suggested a right of privacy is the underlying prem-
ise of the fourth amendment.
In Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956),
Iowa allowed a cause of action for invasion of privacy for the first time. The plaintiffs had
sued the local newspaper for publishing an allegedly obscene photograph of their deceased
child. The court noted that as of 1956, 20 states had recognized a right of privacy, while 4
had rejected it. See also Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974).
Dean Prosser eventually systematized the right of privacy into 4 separate torts: (1) put-
ting another in a false light, (2) appropriating another's name or reputation, (3) intruding
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In an early Supreme Court case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts," 3
the Court held that no right of privacy had been violated by a
state program of mandatory smallpox vaccination. By 1942, how-
ever, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 1 4 the Court found that a state law
mandating sterilization for thrice-convicted felons was an uncon-
stitutional infringement on a prisoner's privacy. Ten years later,
in Rochin v. California,II5 the Court held that police efforts to ob-
tain evidence from a suspect by forcibly pumping his stomach was
an egregious assault on his constitutional right of privacy. State
intrusion on one's bodily integrity "shocked the conscience," said
Justice Frankfurter, and offended notions of civilized conduct.' 1
6
Once the right of a married couple to use contraceptives found
its place under the privacy umbrella in Griswold,I 7 the extension
of that right to all individuals, married or not, was a short step. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,"8 William Baird had exhibited contraceptive
devices during the course of a lecture and distributed them to the
audience at the close of his presentation. Writing for the Supreme
Court, Justice Brennan indicated that Griswold did more than rec-
ognize a mere right of marital privacy; Griswold encompassed the
right of an individual to decide whether or not to beget chil-
dren. "19
The Court's holdings in Griswold and Eisenstadt actually had
two precursors dating back to the earlier part of this century and
the Supreme Court's venture into substantive due process. In
upon another's seclusion, and (4) publicly disclosing private facts about another. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 804-15 (4th ed. 1971).
113. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
114. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing that the right of procreation is a basic civil right
of which a person cannot be deprived by the state).
115. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stating that the state may not justify brutal bodily intrusion
even if it is the only way to obtain evidence for trial).
116. Id. at 172-73. This approach-affirming a constitutional right by relying on the
perceptions or predilections of the Justices, rather than on clear constitutional lan-
guage-appalled Justice Black, and would continue to do so as later cases established
broader applications of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665
(1961) (Black, J., concurring) (praising the Court's rejeCtion of what he perceived to be the
"shock-the-conscience" standard of Rochin in the context of procedural due process).
117. See text accompanying notes 100-101 supra.
118. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority stated:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot
be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally im-
permissible. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person. . . as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.




Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 20 the Court recognized a parental
right to send children to religious schools. Meyer v. Nebraska1
marked the Court's acknowledgment that parents-and not the
state-have the right to decide whether children can learn a for-
eign language. Both Pierce and Meyer are cited in Moore as col-
lective support for the proposition that the state has no right to
standardize its children-and, by extension, its adults.' 22 Indeed,
a common thread throughout the privacy fabric woven by the
Supreme Court is the recognition of private human
processes-both mental and physical-with which the govern-
ment may not interfere without demonstrating a compelling rea-
son to do so. Constitutional protection, therefore, is accorded to
conduct, behavior, and life choices which are intimate and per-
sonal. Baird's right to distribute contraceptives to willing individ-
uals 123 and Skinner's right not to be sterilized against his will' 24
relate to a "family" interest in only its broadest and most generic
sense. To regard such cases as representing "family privacy" in
the same sense as blood relatives exercising a private choice is
overly narrow and inaccurate. Yet, that is precisely what Moore
appears to have done.
B. The Right to Privacy After Belle Terre and Moore
Moore may be read as joining this line of bodily integrity and
intimate choice cases by explicitly linking the privacy right to the
status of the Moores' relationship. The fact of blood ties may
have been incidental. It is possible, however, that blood relation
was a necessary prerequisite to the existence of the right of privacy
in the eyes of the Moore Court. Justice Powell's plurality opinion
speaks of "this degree of kinship" (grandmother to grandsons)
meriting a finding of a right to private choice in selecting living
companions. 25 It is not clear whether distant cousins have this
right. Justice Powell expressly distinguished Belle Terre as not in-
volving a family.' 6 Thus it may be argued that Moore does not
affirm individual rights in the area of intimate decisionmaking.
120. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
121. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
122. 431 U.S. at 505.
123. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
124. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
125. 431 U.S. at 505-06.
126. Id. at 498.
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Rather, it appears to confine the application of privacy to the lit-
eral meaning and context of the symbolic construct, the "family."
The effect of narrowing privacy rights to their most basic sym-
bolic context-the home or family-is heightened by the decision
in Belle Terre. To the consternation of commentators who have
followed Justice Douglas' long identification with individual
rights,'27 the Justice flatly denied that the students' right of pri-
vacy was violated by Belle Terre's zoning ordinance.' 28 The
Court found the "family" provision, which allowed one person or
two unrelated persons, as well as conventional blood- or mar-
riage-related persons, to live in Belle Terre, constitutionally
sound.' 29 In Belle Terre, the sanctity of the "home" failed to ex-
tend to three or more unrelated persons who live together in a
residence. If home equals family-and if one is to be consistent
with Moore-then privacy in the home is limited to family pri-
vacy.
The spectrum of core privacy rights to which the Moore and
Belle Terre decisions belong includes a number of other home-as-
sanctuary decisions, 130 which demonstrate that home is not neces-
sarily to be defined in the context of blood ties. Stanley v. Geor-
gia,131 for example, involved a drug raid on a home which
resulted in the confiscation of obscene materials. The Court held
a conviction for possession of those materials to be invalid on the
grounds that privacy rights had been violated. Similarly, in
Rowan v. United States Post Office Devt, 32 a person's mailbox
127. Eg., Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individualiy: The Privacy Opinions
ofJustice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978). The author found Justice Douglas' extreme
deference to the village "surprising." Id. at 1598. The Note traces the development of
Justice Douglas' commitment to protection of individualism, concluding that Belle Terre is
out of step with four other opinions on related subjects written by Justice Douglas. Id. at
1598 n.108. One of those contradictory opinions is United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See notes 167-80 infra and
accompanying text.
128. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
129. Id. at 8. The Court added at this point that "The ordinance places no ban on
other forms of association, for a 'family' may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, enter-
tain whomever it likes." Id. at 9. It is this rather cavalier dismissal of the students' associa-
tional and privacy claims which Justice Marshall found disturbing. Id. at 17 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), which involved a Post
Office requirement that Mr. Lamont make a positive request for certain political mail to be
delivered to him. The Court found such a requirement to be an invasion of his right to
receive mail like any other person in the privacy and anonymity of his home.
131. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
132. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In this case, the Court balanced first amendment free speech
against the right to be let alone. Chief Justice Burger found:
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was found to be an extension of the private realm of one's home.
These decisions indicate that the core right of privacy may be
conveniently labelled as "home"-related. They also indicate that
exercise of the right is not contingent on genetic heritage, unless
the Court purports in Belle Terre and Moore substantially to con-
strict the parameters of privacy law. Decisions from Griswold to
Rowan interpret the right of privacy as a protection of personal
conduct in order that one not have the government peering over
one's shoulder to read one's mail or check whether one is viewing
pornography or using contraceptives in the bedroom. Whether
that conduct is or is not carried out with one's kin is irrelevant.
Choosing one's living companions would appear to be an act
which the government may not monitor. On most scales of
human values, it would seem to rank at least as high as one's right
to receive mail. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Belle Terre, in-
sisted that a choice of home is a fundamental constitutional value:
The choice of household companions-of whether a person's
"intellectual and emotional needs" are best met by living with
family, friends, professional associates, or others-involves
deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of
intimate relationships within the home. That decision surely
falls within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by the
Constitution.' 33
Justice Marshall then cited as support the same line of cases which
Justice Powell cited in his plurality opinion in Moore.134 The lat-
ter textual citation, however, was preceded by a far narrower in-
terpretation of that line of cases: "'This Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
or family ife is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"'" Ironically, three
years after his broad affirmation in Belle Terre of anyone's right to
choose living companions, Justice Marshall joined Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion in Moore in stating with apparent ap-
proval, that Belle Terre actually supports the plurality opinion in
IT]he right of every person "to be let alone" must be placed in the scales with the
right of others to communicate. . .[A] sufficient measure of individual auton-
omy must survive to permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted
mail . . . . [A] mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee.
Id. at 736-37.
133. 416 U.S. at 16.
134. 431 U.S. at 499.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moore.136 Justice Marshall's views appear to have come full cir-
cle as he joined the Moore plurality in distinguishing Bell Terre's
ordinance from East Cleveland's. The Belle Terre ordinance "af-
fected only unrelated individuals. It expressly allowed all who
were related by 'blood, adoption, or marriage' to live together, and
in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to note that it pro-
moted 'family needs and family values.' -137
C. The Creation and Development of Informational Privacy
The shrinkage of the core from "home" in a broad generic
sense to "family" in its most literal sense may be part of a general
Supreme Court retrenchment in the area of privacy law. This
consolidation is especially apparent in an area of privacy jurispru-
dence which may be termed "informational privacy."
Informational privacy involves an assertion by an individual
that intimate decisions, made in private, not be the subject of state
recordkeeping or governmental publicity. In this area, the Court
has been much more inclined to tip the balance toward state exer-
cise of traditional police powers-health, safety, welfare, and
morals.
For example, in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 38 the
plaintiff complained that the recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, 139 whereby customer identi-
ties and copies of all checks must be available to the government
for scrutiny, infringed upon the privacy of bank customers. The
majority held that the government's interest in pursuit of potential
criminal evidence outweighed the constitutional privacy interests
of customers. t4° Justices Powell and Blackmun added a caveat,
however, in a brief concurrence.' 4 ' They indicated that if the Act
had applied to all customers with deposits, and not just those with
deposits over $10,000, they would have found a constitutional pri-
vacy violation. Their concurrence, and Justice Douglas' dis-
sent,14 2 pointed out that one's cancelled checks reflect one's
beliefs, activities, and associations. "At some point, governmental
intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expecta-
136. Id. at 511 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring).
137. Id. at 498.
138. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
139. 84 Stat. 1114 (codified in scattered sections of 12,31 U.S.C.).
140. 416 U.S. at 69.
141. Id. at 78-79 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
142. Id. at 79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tions of privacy."' 43 Justice Douglas also admonished that "a per-
son is defined by the checks he writes" and "[w]here fundamental
personal rights are involved-. . . when as here the Government
gets large access to one's beliefs, ideas, politics, religion, cultural
concerns, and the like-the Act should be 'narrowly drawn'.
to meet the precise evil.'"
It is ironic that California Bankers was announced on the same
day as Belle Terre. It is tempting to suggest that one is as "de-
fined" by the company one keeps as by the checks one writes. It
appears perplexing that Justice Douglas should write two opinions
back to back, recognizing a fundamental privacy interest in one's
financial transactions in California Bankers and denying such an
interest in one's choice of living companions in Belle Terre. The
majority opinions in Calfornia Bankers and Belle Terre are only
consistent to the extent that they find governmental interests in
criminal investigation or zoning stronger than any invasion of in-
dividual privacy.
Another case which arose out of a similar law enforcement
concern is Whalen v. Roe.' 45 In Whalen, doctors and patients
challenged the New York State Controlled Substances Act of
1972.146 The Act required that the names, addresses, and ages of
all persons who had received doctors' prescriptions for drugs such
as amphetamines, cocaine, or methadone be recorded in a state
data bank. Such drugs are legitimate treatment for migraine
headaches, hyperkinesia, and epilepsy, but are subject to patient
abuse. 47 Plaintiffs claimed infringement of their right to privacy
given the potential for leakage of such delicate personal informa-
tion and obvious attendant harm to reputations. They also argued
that fear of disclosure had a chilling effect on behavior.14 8 The
Court observed that privacy law covers at least two general areas:
the freedom to make decisions in private and the freedom to con-
trol government access to information about oneself.149 The
Court found neither version implicated in Whalen, since the Act
143. Id. at 78-79. None of the three Justices made clear when this point would be
reached. Presumably they would agree that a dragnet law with no clear criminal investiga-
tion purpose would fall on grounds of overbreadth.
144. Id. at 85-86.
145. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
146. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3397 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
147. 429 U.S. at 591-92, 593 n.8.
148. Id. at 600.
149. Id. at 599-600.
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provided for adequate safeguards and penalties for disclosure. 150
The decision was unanimous.
Controlling public information about oneself may also be ex-
pressed as an interest in one's reputation. In Paul v. Davis,15 ' a
news photographer was arrested on suspicion of shoplifting. The
charges were dropped, but a flyer on "active shoplifters" with his
name and photograph on it had already been distributed by police
to shopowners. Like the students in Belle Terre, Paul brought a
section 1983 action,' 52 claiming invasion of his privacy. The
plaintiff asserted that injury to his reputation and future employ-
ment prospects intruded on both his privacy and property liberty
interests. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-member majority,
declined to extend the Roe v. Wade line of privacy cases to em-
brace such an interest in reputation. The Court held that the
claimants' "freedom of action" was not at stake, nor had there
been an actual loss of employment." 3 The decision in Paul thus
swings back full circle to Warren and Brandeis' conception of the
right to privacy as the right to preserve one's "inviolate personal-
ity" as a form of property right in one's self-image 154 -and rejects
it.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White objected strenuously to
the majority's crabbed construction of personal liberty.'t5  They
maintained that privacy law since Meyer and Pierce had included
protection of a broad variety of interests and that one's public rep-
utation should not be more vulnerable to arbitrary or injurious
150. Id. at 605. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, suggested that some report-
ing was to be expected in the medical field. He cautioned, however, that without the safe-
guards written into the law, or in the event of abuse of the information held by the state,
the statute would clearly violate constitutionally protected privacy rights. Id. at 608 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
151. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
152. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), provides that an individual may
seek a civil remedy for the violation of his or her federal rights by any agency of a state
operating under color of state law. Although such an inquiry is beyond-the- scope of this
Note, it is curious that § 1983 actions never seem to fare well in the context of "penumbral"
rights such as privacy and association. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Brown v. Caliente, 392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1968); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1964).
153. 424 U.S. at 713.
154. See notes 108-109 supra and accompanying text.
155. 424 U.S. 693 (Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dissenting). The three dissenters in-
sisted that the majority's reading of precedent was "unduly restrictive in its construction of
our precious Bill of Rights" and that prior liberty interest cases had not been rationally




state action than one's choice of schools or languages for one's
children.156
These recent decisions suggest several conclusions about the
way in which Moore and Belle Terre fit into the continuum of
privacy interests. Attempts to expand the developing right of pri-
vacy into areas beyond the core of intimate decisionmaking have
apparently failed. It is not unlikely that even existing privacy law
might be viewed by the Court with a less favorable eye.' 57 The
lack of unanimity or even a strong consensus of opinion in core
privacy cases suggests that privacy law is on shaky ground, and
that any further narrowing of the dimensions of "privacy" could
threaten the vitality of venerable privacy decisions such as Gris-
wold, Roe, Eisenstadt, Rochin, and Skinner.
In this light, the Belle Terre decision does not appear to be
such an aberration after all. It is simply one more instance of the
Court's reluctance to allow any further elaboration of privacy
freedoms. 158 This is not to suggest that the choice of living com-
panions is identical to the interest in not being publicly labelled a
drug addict or criminal. The general division of privacy into the
intimate decisionmaking of Belle Terre and Moore and "informa-
tional" privacy in California Bankers, Whalen and Paul, is still
apt, or at least convenient.' Nonetheless, the line between the
two categories is blurred.
Belle Terre's refusal to examine the fundamental interest of
unrelated persons in choosing housemates blurs the line further.
State police power interests in controlling petty crime and drug
abuse are now ranked with zoning prerogatives. All are superior
to privacy assertions. The Moores, but for the compassionate in-
tervention of four Justices, would have had to split up their ex-
tended family. The pathos of a grandmother being branded a
criminal for wanting to raise her motherless ten year old grand-
sons may not be present in the next case. The Moore decision,
upholding rights of privacy and association for related persons
against zoning power may itself be short-lived with such slim sup-
port.
156. Id.
157. Thus, dissenting in Moore, Justice White said that Griswold, Roe, Elsenstadt, and
others of that genre should not be overruled. 431 U.S. 494 (White, J., dissenting). Yet,
there is an implicit "but" following his assertion. One senses that he wishes such decisions
had never been made-he dissented in many of them.
158. See text accompanying notes 138-53 supra.
159. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
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A similar fate may befall the constitutional right of associa-
tion. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting in Moore, posed
the question: what difference should blood-relatedness make to
the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right?
To suggest that the biological fact of common ancestry neces-
sarily gives related persons constitutional rights of association
superior to those of unrelated persons is to misunderstand the
nature of the associational freedoms that the Constitution has
been understood to protect. Freedom of association [or pri-
vacy] has been constitutionally recognized because it is often
indispensable to effectuation of explicit First Amendment guar-
antees. 1
60
The two Justices had a simple answer to their query. Neither re-
lated nor unrelated persons should have a right of association if
the only justifications they assert are "gratification, convenience,
and economy of sharing the same residence."1 6' The answer
could just as easily be the opposite: if there is a constitutional
right of association in choosing one's living companions, both re-
lated and unrelated persons should be able to assert it.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Freedom of association, like the right of privacy, has been
found in the shadowed zones of constitutional guarantees of
speech, assembly, press, and religion. 16  The Court has firmly
supported the first amendment right to exercise one's political be-
liefs in association with others. Twenty years ago, in NAACP v.
Alabama, 63 the Court invalidated an Alabama law which re-
quired that the NAACP file its membership lists with the state.
The Court held that members of the NAACP were entitled to the
right of association without threat of state scrutiny and the con-
comitant chilling effect upon the pursuit of political objectives.'"
Two other NAACP decisions, Bates v. City of Little Rock 65
and Shelton v. Tucker, 66 utilized the same analysis. The Court
found, respectively, that state justifications for needing members'
names in order to collect a license tax on trades, and wanting "rel-
evant" information on outside activities of school teachers, were
160. 431 U.S. at 535.
161. Id. at 536.
162. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
163. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
164. Id. at 466.
165. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
166. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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inadequate to support state scrutiny of NAACP membership
lists. 167
Until United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,16 8
the right of association had been generally confined to a political,
racial, or religious context. Moreno appears to have given the
right of association a socioeconomic gloss. In a factual context
reminiscent of the Belle Terre and Moore zoning ordinances,
Moreno involved the restriction of food stamp eligibility to house-
holds of related persons. Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of
1964169 excluded from the subsidy program any household con-
taining one individual unrelated to any other member of the
household. The original version of section 3(e) used the broader
classification of an "economic unit sharing common cooking facil-
ities." A 1971 congressional amendment, however, evidently
aimed at preventing "hippies and communes" from taking advan-
tage of the program, specified that a household could only mean
related persons or nonrelated persons over age sixty.'
70
The plaintiffs were several groups of unrelated indigent per-
sons caught in this congressional web of exclusion. The Court
found that the objectives of the Act-raising levels of nutrition
among the nation's poor and strengthening the agricultural econ-
omy-were ill-served by the classification of households into "re-
lated" and "unrelated."' 7 ' The Court concluded that the 1971
amendment violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights by ex-
cluding not those likely to abuse the food stamp program but
"only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that
they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to
retain their eligibility."'172
Justice Douglas cast an equally penetrating light on the con-
troversy. "This case involves desperately poor people with acute
problems who, though unrelated, come together for mutual help
and assistance." 171 Justice Douglas declared that the banding to-
gether of people to fight the age-old enemies of hunger and pov-
erty was a protected freedom of association "deep in our
traditions."'" Further, "[tiaking a person into one's home be-
167. Id. at 527; 361 U.S. at 489-90.
168. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
169. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964) (amended 1971).
170. 413 U.S. at 530.
171. Id. at 533-34.
172. Id. at 538 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring opinion).
174. Id.
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cause he is poor or needs help or brings happiness to the house-
hold is of the same dignity" as the right of parents to have their
children study German or the right of adults to use contracep-
tives. 175
From Moreno, it may fairly be inferred that the right of associ-
ation has taken on broader implications. The majority's decision
indicated that relatedness--or lack of it---cannot rationally serve
the usual purposes of economic and social legislation designed to
cure pervasive societal ills. If this is so, a classification of house-
hold "economic units sharing a kitchen" on the basis of blood-
relatedness seems as irrational in a zoning context as in Moreno's
context of food stamp distribution. Yet, in a peculiarly terse and
puzzling footnote, the Belle Terre majority rejected Moreno as
"inapt."' 76 Justice Marshall, dissenting in Belle Terre, wondered
how Justice Douglas could so blithely lay aside his Moreno opin-
ion. 177 Justice Marshall himself read Moreno as standing for the
proposition that the right to invite strangers into one's home ex-
tended not only to entertainment but also to the choice of living
companions.
A closer reading of Justice Douglas' concurrence in Moreno
reveals the seeds of his seemingly inconsistent opinion in Belle
Terre. In clarifying his views with respect to taking needy persons
into one's home, he remarked that the "unrelated person" provi-
sion was not aimed at the maintenance of normal family ties.'78
Had it been so aimed, the law would have been sustained. This
idea is repeated later:
Since the "unrelated" person provision is not directed to the"
maintenance of the famiy as a unit but treats impoverished
households composed of relatives more favorably than impov-
erished households having a single unrelated person, it draws a
line that can be sustained only on a showing of a "compelling"
governmental interest.'79
Extending the import of this dictum to the Belle Terre context,
it is apparent that the Court, speaking through Justice Douglas,
regarded the village's zoning provision as one "directed at the
maintenance of the family unit." The Belle Terre decision explic-
itly identifies one legitimate zoning goal (albeit one newly in-
175. Id. at 542.
176. The footnote declared that Moreno was "inapt as there a household containing
anyone unrelated to the rest was denied foodstamps." 416 U.S. at 8 n.6.
177. Id. at 17-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. 413 U.S. at 542.
179. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
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vented for the occasion) as the creation of a "land use project
addressed to family needs."'
80
There is indeed a surface contradiction between Moreno and
Belle Terre regarding the rationality of classifying people by
blood ties. It would seem that this distinction permits the denial
of rights to a group unfortunate enough not to have kin, but grants
those rights to a group with kin. The "family maintenance" gloss
in Moreno, however, presaged the fuller development of that idea
in Belle Terre and renders the two decisions more consistent than
they otherwise appear. It is then echoed in Moore, once the state
is found to be interfering with maintenance of the family.
If a socioeconomic right of association remains after Belle
Terre's efforts to distinguish Moreno, it does so only when the
most dire of circumstances exist: abject poverty, malnutrition, or
threats to the efforts of the powerless to retain their dignity. It
may well be that the relative freedom of the Belle Terre students
to move elsewhere without hardship encouraged the Court to pass
so quickly over their "fundamental rights" claims in the presence
of such a powerful countervailing interest as local zoning preroga-
tives.' 8'
IV. CONCLUSION
Viewed narrowly, Moore and Belle Terre are superficially con-
sistent decisions. They both affirm the enduring American heri-
tage of strong family orientation,' 2 albeit in the narrow,
traditional sense of "nuclear" and "extended" family. Both deci-
sions reaffirm that zoning is a critical historic local function with
which the Supreme Court will not lightly tamper.'83 However,
this surface consistency produces an anomalous result. Read to-
gether, Moore and Belle Terre stand for the ironic proposition that
it is the village or municipality that may invoke "family values" as
180. 416 U.S. at 9.
181. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 975-80 (1978). Professor Tribe
suggests that one explanation of Belle Terre may be that the Court saw a stronger associa-
tional right among the villagers themselves. Justice Douglas did refer to the village as a
"sanctuary for people." 416 U.S. at 9. Professor Tribe proceeds, however, to question this
view. In particular, he notes that a village, as a state subdivision, should not be allowed to
create invidious classifications in the name of its own penumbral rights. Further, even if
the village was supposed to be acting as a whole for self-protection, its alleged consensus
became a sham once the homeowner decided to rent to the students.
182. 431 U.S. at 503-06; 416 U.S. at 9-10.
183. 431 U.S. at 498-99; 416 U.S. at 4-7. Justice Marshall remarked that the Court
does not "sit as a super zoning board of appeals." 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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a constitutional bar to outsiders, whereas, given the meager sup-
port for Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Moore, family groups
will have a difficult time in the future asserting the "right to family
choice" in forming a household. This will be especially true for
foster homes, halfway houses, small groups of retired persons, and
other less conventional, self-defined "families." Such a result
marks a fundamental shift away from the firmly held view of state
courts that formation of a household may legitimately be based on
economics, convenience, or other intangible human considera-
tions, with the state deciding solely questions of general land us-
age.
Although their intention was to deny the right to choose one's
living companions, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist made a valua-
ble observation when they pointed out in their dissent in Moore
that it should not make any constitutional difference whether a
person associates with a cousin or a colleague-the measure of
protection (high or low) should be the same. State court decisions
appear to agree with the two Justices' view, albeit with the oppo-
site intention of affirming the right to choose one's living compan-
ions. It remains for future decisions to pinpoint the proper
balance between zoning goals and individual rights under the
Constitution. In the interim, state court interpretations of a "fam-
ily" as a single housekeeping unit--developed over half a century
in the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement-have been
jeopardized.
PATRICIA FITTS JACOBSON
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